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LIMITED LIABILITY IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
George W. Dent, Jr.* 
INTRODUCTION 
The costs of repairing environmental damage often exceed the pol-
luter's ability to pay. Government then seeks out others to help finance 
the bill. When the polluter is an insolvent corporation, attention naturally 
falls on its controlling person, especially if the controlling person is a par-
ent corporation. The obstacle to recovery is a long-standing hallmark of 
corporate law, the principle of limited liability. Traditionally, sharehold-
ers, officers, and others affiliated with a corporation have not been held 
liable for the corporation's debts. Limited liability always has been con-
troversial. In America, unlike many other countries, courts always have 
been willing to "pierce the corporate veil" under certain circumstances. 
The problem is defining the special circumstances that justify piercing. 
Commentators have pored over limited liability for contract obligations 
but have generally ignored its logic for tort liability. 
The social importance and immense costs of pollution make environ-
mental law an ideal arena for reconsidering theories of limited liability for 
tort. This article examines the question in the context of the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
CLA).1 Part I reviews the text and legislative history of the Act. Part II 
analyzes the CERCLA case law on the liability of controlling persons, es-
pecially those involving parent corporations. Part III discusses the gen-
eral theory of limited liability and its exceptions. Part IV applies this 
general theory to CERCLA and finds that its special features call for dis-
tinctive approaches. Part V advocates an approach to controlling person 
liability that furthers the purposes of the Act without impairing other 
important policies. 
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. J.D. Columbia 
University School of Law; LL.M. New York University School of Law. The author gratefully 
acknowledges the helpful comments of Ron Coffey, Peter Junger, Gerry Korngold, Max 
Mehlman, Bob Strassfeld, and participants in the Case Western Reserve University School 
of Law Faculty Seminar. He also thanks Kevin Adler and James Brouner for helpful re-
search assistance. Support for research on this paper was provided by a research grant from 
the Edwin Z. Singer Endowment Fund. 
1. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980). The Act was amended by the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). 
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I. THE TEXT AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF CERCLA 
A. The Structure of the Act 
Congress enacted CERCLA to tackle the herculean task of cleaning 
up hazardous waste throughout the country.2 The Act authorizes the En-
vironmental Protection Agency (the EPA) to arrange for such cleanups. 3 
The EPA may, but need not, permit the owner or operator to perform the 
cleanup. 4 If the government performs the cleanup, it may use money from 
the hazardous substance "Superfund." The Superfund was created by 
CERCLA for the purpose of cleaning up such waste dumps.5 The EPA 
may in turn recover the cleanup costs from those "responsible persons"6 
who disposed, transported, or arranged for the disposal or transportation 
of the hazardous waste. Further, CERCLA authorizes recov~ry of cleanup 
costs from those who own or operate a facility containing hazardous 
waste, or who owned or operated the facility at the time of a release.' 
CERCLA response costs include all costs of a cleanup, even if the 
costs exceed the benefits of the cleanup.8 Although the statute does not 
2. By early 1990 about 1,200 sites had been named for cleanup, "and estimates of the 
total cleanup bill go as high as $700 billion." Sommerfield. Going Bare, INSTITUTIONAL IN-
VESTOR 99, 102 (Mar. 1990). The contamination of Love Canal alone triggered claims total-
ling over $2 billion. S. EPSTEIN, L. BROWN & C. POPE, HAZARDOUS WASTE IN AMERICA 360 
(1982). 
3. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(l) (1988). The EPA acts under statutory authority delegated by 
the President. ld. Under section 9606(a) the EPA may also "secure such relief as may be 
necessary to abate" any "imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or 
welfare or the environment because of an actual or threatened release of a hazardous sub-
stance .... " 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988). 
4. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(l) (1988). 
5. 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1988). 
6. Although the Act does not define this term, it uses "responsible person" to refer to 
any person liable under the Act. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c) (1988). 
7. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). The EPA has preferred this approach to having the 
owner or operator perform the cleanup. See infra note 31. 
8. Section 9607(a)(4) requires payment of: 
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Gov-
ernment or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contin-
gency plan; 
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consis-
tent with the national contingency plan; [and] 
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources .... 
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988). Section 9604(a)(l)(B) requires that any cleanup ordered or 
arranged by the President be "consistent with the national contingency plan" and that 
"[t]he President shall give primary attention to those releases which the President deems 
may present a public health threat." The national contingency plan, created under 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1321(c) (1988), is contained in 40 C.F.R. § 300 (1989). Section 962l(a) instructs the Presi-
dent to select remedial actions "which provide for cost-effective response." 42 U.S.C. § 
962l(a) (1988). 
Although these clauses might give the President discretion to consider cost effectiveness 
in deciding when and how far to order a cleanup, they provide no defense to a responsible 
person on grounds that the costs of the cleanup exceed the benefits. Liability apparently can 
be limited only if the government's action is arbitrary or capricious (see .generally United 
States v. Ottati & Goss, 694 F. Supp. 977 (D.N.H. 1988), modified, 900 F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 
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specifically decree joint and several liability in cases involving several re-
sponsible persons, the courts have regularly imposed it unless a defendant 
can demonstrate that the damage is divisible. 9 Proving divisibility is prac-
tically impossible. 10 However, the Act does encourage reasonable settle-
ments with de minimis contributors.U Further, CERCLA generally 
permits actions for contribution12 based on each defendant's relative de-
gree of fault. 18 A party that settles with the government, though, is not 
liable for contribution to other defendants. 14 
CERCLA is often described as imposing strict liability. In many re-
spects this description is justified. To prove liability the plaintiff need not 
show fault on the part of the defendant, and proof of the defendant's care 
or lack of fault is often not a defense.16 One can even incur liability with-
out knowing that one was handling hazardous wastes.16 For example, one 
employer was held liable for illegal releases by its employees even though 
1990)); or inconsistent with the national contingency plan (see generally United States v. 
Northernaire Plating Co., 685 F. Supp. 1410 (W.D. Mich. 1988), aff'd sub nom., United 
States v. Meyer, 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1527 (1990)). 
9. See, e.g., O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Mon-
santo Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989); United 
States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chern. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732 n.3 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 n.13 (2d 
Cir. 1985). 
10. To prove divisibility, a defendant must show a reasonable basis for apportionment 
of the harm. See O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178-79 (1st Cir. 1989). In United States v. 
Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171-72 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989), the 
Fourth Circuit rejected the defendant's attempt to prove the portion of the waste that it 
had deposited because the defendant did not show "the individual and interactive qualities 
of' the wastes deposited or "a relationship between waste volume, the release of hazardous 
substances, and the harm at the site." Accord, United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. 
Supp. 1361, 1396 (D.N.H. 1985), modified, 900 F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 1990). See also Barr, CER-
CLA Made Simple: An Analysis of the Cases under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980,45 Bus. LAw. 923, 977-79 (1990) [herein-
after Barr]. 
11. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g) (1988). 
12. 42 u.s.c. § 9613(0 (1988). 
13. See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 168 n.13 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. 
denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989); Barr, supra note 10, at 992-93. 
14. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(C) (1988). 
15. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 n.ll (4th Cir. 1988), 
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 
(2d Cir. 1985); Missouri v. Independent Petrochem. Corp., 610 F. Supp. 4 (E.D. Mo. 1985) 
(defendant who properly disposed of waste held liable for removal of the waste by a third 
party regardless of whether the removal was foreseeable). But cf. Florida Power & Light Co. 
v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 1990) (mere sale of hazardous 
substances does not incur CERCLA liability if seller was not arranging for disposal of sub-
stances). Congress believes that handling hazardous wastes is an ultrahazardous activity. 
See 126 Cong. Rec. 31,964-65 (1980) (statement of Rep. Florio); 126 Cong. Rec. 31,978 
(1980) (statement of Rep. Jeffords); 126 Cong. Rec. 30,932 (1980) (statement of Sen. Ran-
dolph); S. Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-15, 31-34 (1980); Barr, supra note 10, at 
976-77. 
16. See generally United States v. Dickerson, 640 F. Supp. 448 (D. Md. 1986) (igno-
rance that materials were hazardous is not defense). 
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the employees took bribes and violated the employer's rules in so doing.17 
Strict liability extends to acts of others with whom one has contracted. 
Thus, the generator who contracts to have toxic waste disposed of by an-
other is liable if the disposer fails to do the job properly. The degree of 
care with which the generator chose and monitored the disposer is irrele-
vant.18 Contractual waivers or limitations on liability may bind the con-
tracting parties but are void as against the government.10 Liability is 
retroactive. Accordingly, it is no defense that the acts for which liability is 
alleged were committed or the response costs incurred before CERCLA 
was enacted. 20 
However, the Act does permit defenses for, among other things, acts 
of God, acts of war, and acts by third persons with whom the defendant 
has no employment or other contractual relationship.21 It also exculpates 
the purchaser of a contaminated facility who "did not know and had no 
reason to know" of the toxic waste despite "all appropriate inquiry into 
the previous ownership and uses of the property consistent with good 
commercial or customary practice in an effort to minimize liability."22 Al-
though a few courts have permitted defendants to plead equitable de-
fenses such as estoppel, waiver, and release, so far no equitable defense 
has been sustained. 23 Thus, although CERCLA often imposes strict liabil-
ity, Congress chose not to inflict liability on many defendants who are 
without fault. 
17. City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chern. Co., 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20133 
(E.D. Pa. July 28, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist. file, 7058). 
18. For a discussion of the responsibility of generators, see infra notes 130-31 and 
accompanying text. 
19. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e) (1988). 
20. See United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chern. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732-37 (8th 
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). 
21. Section 9607(b) precludes liability for a defendant "who can establish by a prepon-
derance of the evidence" that the release was "caused solely by ... (1) an act of God" or 
"(2) an act of war" or: 
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the 
defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a con-
tractual relationship . _ . if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the 
evidence that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance 
concerned and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of 
any such third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from 
such acts or omissions . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988). The third-party defense has often been narrowly construed. See 
Missouri v. Independent Petrochem. Corp., 610 F. Supp. 4, 5 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (defense not 
available to generator even though contract with transporter expressly provided that waste 
would be disposed of at a different site). The Act also excludes liability for federally permit-
ted releases, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(j) (1988); and for damages described in an environmental im-
pact statement that was approved, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(£)(1) (1988). 
22. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (1988). Even before this amendment was added to the statute 
some courts recognized the problems of imposing liability on an innocent purchaser. See In 
re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 675 F. Supp. 22, 32 (D. Mass. 1987) 
(excessive parent liability could discourage corporations from purchasing contaminated fa-
cilities through a well-capitalized subsidiary and cleaning them up). 
23. See Barr, supra note 10, at 991-92. 
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In addition to civil CERCLA liability, hazardous waste releases can 
lead to penalties and fines under CERCLA and other laws. Willful viola-
tion of an abatement order can be punished with a fine of up to $25,000 
per day.24 Failure "without sufficient cause to properly provide removal or 
remedial action upon order of the President" can result in punitive dam-
ages of up to three times the costs incurred by Superfund as a result of 
the failure. 25 Civil penalties of up to $25,000 per day can be levied for 
violation of the notice, record-keeping, financial responsibility regula-
tions, or orders relating to any settlement agreements or administrative 
orders under the Act.26 Moreover, state laws impose additional fines, pen-
alties, and punitive damages. 
In order to further discourage hazardous waste releases by persons 
who cannot pay the resulting cleanup costs, Congress authorized the 
President to adopt regulations to assure the financial responsibility of fa-
cilities handling hazardous wastes.27 Congress also exempted from state 
insurance laws "risk retention groups" that cover pollution liability 
only.28 Thus, Congress facilitated the availability of cleanup insurance 
and aided chemical firms in meeting CERCLA's response costs.29 
In specifying the scope of cleanups under CERCLA, Congress has not 
gone as far as it might have. The statute requires only what is "practica-
ble. "30 To determine what is practicable, the EPA employs a cost-benefit 
analysis. However, the EPA is not required to and does not consistently 
apply the analysis. 31 
Although CERCLA's provisions are elaborate, they contain many 
drafting gaps. Congress intended the federal courts to fill these gaps 
through federal common law. 32 
24. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1) (1988). 
25. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3) (1988). 
26. 42 u.s.c. § 9609 (1988). 
27. 42 U.S.C. § 9608 (1988). Similar provision is made for financial responsibility of 
owners of ships carrying hazardous substances by 33 U.S.C. § 132l(p) (1988). Regulations 
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-91 (1988), 
require owners and operators of treatment, storage and disposal facilities to demonstrate 
financial responsibility. 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.111-.120, .142-.147, .151, 265.111-.117, .142-.147 
(1989). 
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9671-75 (1988). 
29. Id. 
30. 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (1988). 
31. See Barr, supra note 10, at 931. Problems may arise in the EPA's choice of reme-
dies. The EPA may either clean up a waste site and pursue responsible parties for the re-
sulting costs, or it may sue to compel responsible parties to clean up the site. See supra note 
7 and accompanying text. In practice, it usually does the former. See Note, The Threat to 
Investment in the Hazardous Waste Industry: An Analysis of Individual and Corporate 
Shareholder Liability Under CERCLA, 1%7 UTAH L. REv. 585, 590-93. Since the govern-
ment may not be as efficient or cost-conscious in the cleanup as a responsible private party 
would, this practice may ultimately increase the costs of cleanups. 
32. Federal common law was needed to achieve a uniformity that would not be possi-
ble if federal courts filled the gaps in CERCLA by resorting to state law. See 126 Cong. Rec. 
31,965 (1980) (statement of Rep. Florio). See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 
160, 171 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989); Smith Land & Improv. Corp. v. 
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B. Controlling Person Liability and the Text of CERCLA 
Some courts have imposed CERCLA liability on parents and other 
controlling persons of responsible corporations on the grounds that Con-
gress intended the Act "to encourage maximum care and responsibility in 
the handling of hazardous wastes. "33 This reasoning is dubious. Although 
many provisions of CERCLA are relatively broad, Congress did not give 
the Act the maximum possible reach. 
CERCLA's definitions of responsible persons, especially for the term 
"owner or operator,"84 are broad but conventional. Under the principle of 
limited liability, legal references to a corporation do not ordinarily in-
clude its shareholders or other controlling persons. 35 Accordingly, a plain 
reading of the statute suggests that controlling persons are not responsi-
ble for a corporation's obligations under section 9607. The breadth of the 
statutory definitions actually supports this view. Clearly, Congress gave 
great thought to the definitions. Thus, the failure to include controlling 
persons does not appear to be a mere oversight. 
This interpretation is reinforced by Congress' express imposition of 
liability on controlling persons in other legislation. The federal securities 
laws, for example, explicitly make controlling persons liable for corporate 
violations.36 More important, Congress did expressly impose controlling 
person liability for some CERCLA violations. In the very section defining 
"owner or operator," Congress did include controlling persons, but only in 
the subsection relating to facilities conveyed to local governments in 
bankruptcy or similar circumstances.37 If Congress intended to hold con-
trolling persons, including parent corporations, liable in other instances, 
it would have inserted a broader definition of controlling person. 38 CER-
Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 837 (1989); Barr, supra 
note 10, 925-26; Note, Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous Waste Cleanup and 
Damages, 99 HARV. L. REV. 986, 999-1001 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Parent Liability]. 
33. Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 1285, 
1290 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1987). See also United States v. Reilly Tar & Chern. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 
1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982) (CERCLA liability "should be given a broad and liberal con-
struction" and "should not be narrowly interpreted."). 
34. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988). 
35. For a discussion of the general rule of limited liability, see infra notes 45-51 and 
accompanying text 
36. Securities Act of 1933, § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 770 (1988); Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78(t) (1988). 
37. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(iii) (1988) ("any person who owned, operated or otherwise 
controlled activities at such facility immediately beforehand") (emphasis added). The Fifth 
Circuit relied on this difference between facilities conveyed to local governments and other 
cases in Joslyn Mfg. Corp. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80 (ath Cir. 1990), petition for 
cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3001 (U.S. July 3, 1990) (No. 89-1973). 
38. The Supreme Court has followed this reasoning in refusing to approve implied 
private damage actions under federal statutes. In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 
560, 572 (1979), the Court, noting the absence of a provision for private damage actions in 
the statute in question, stated "when Congress wished to provide a private damage remedy, 
it knew how to do so and did so expressly." See also Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. 
v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979) ("It is an elemental canon of statutory construction that 
where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of 
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CLA also fails to mention liability of contributors or aiders and abettors. 
Again, the omission indicates Congress' intent because Congress expressly 
imposed liability on such persons under other statutes, including other 
environmental laws. 39 
Instead, CERCLA expressly absolves from liability certain persons 
who may possess some control. For example, it excludes from the defini-
tion of "owner or operator" one who, "without participating in the man-
agement of a ... facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect 
his security interest in the ... facility."40 The statute also fails to name 
directors, officers, other employees, suppliers, or customers, and expressly 
excludes innocent purchasers of contaminated facilities as responsible 
persons.41 
In addition to limits on the scope of responsible persons, CERCLA 
stops short of the maximum possible reach in certain other respects. For 
example, some damages from hazardous waste disposal are not recover-
able under CERCLA,42 and in certain situations state governments are 
liable only for "gross negligence or intentional misconduct."43 Some ex-
press defenses to CERCLA liability have been previously mentioned.44 
This does not mean that CERCLA liability is not broad; obviously it 
is. However, questions of CERCLA's reach cannot be resolved simply by 
resorting to the language and legislative history of the Act, or by incant-
ing that CERCLA should be given the broadest possible interpretation. 
reading others into it."). 
39. E.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 § 7003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 
6973(a) (1988) (imposing liability on "contributors" to the disposal of hazardous 
substances). 
40. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988). Courts disagree over the liability of lenders who do 
not hold indicia of ownership or who do exercise some control. See infra notes 70-80 and 
accompanying text. 
41. For a discussion of the innocent purchaser defense, see supra note 22 and accom-
panying text. 
42. These include diminution of property values, economic loss, and lost income or 
profits. See Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 650-51 
(3d Cir. 1988) (damage to artesian wells not recoverable); Wehner v. Syntex Corp., 681 F. 
Supp. 651, 653 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (recovery for the lost value of a home is economic loss and 
not reasonable under CERCLA); Allied Towing Corp. v. Great Eastern Petroleum Corp., 642 
F. Supp. 1339, 1348 (E.D. Va. 1986) (CERCLA does not provide remedy for plaintiff to 
recoup business losses); Barr, supra note 10, at 971. Recovery of litigation costs and attor-
neys' fees by private plaintiffs remains an unsettled issue. See also General Elec. Co. v. 
Litton Bus. Sys., Inc., 715 F. Supp. 949, 958-59 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (legal fees recoverable 
under CERCLA). 
43. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(2) (1988). Similarly, punitive damages cannot be imposed for 
refusal to comply with a government order under CERCLA if it is made in good faith. See 
Aminoil, Inc. v. United States, 646 F. Supp. 294, 299 (C.D. Cal. 1986); Wagner Elec. Corp. v. 
Thomas, 612 F. Supp. 736, 742-45 (D. Kan. 1985); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chern. 
Corp., 606 F. Supp. 412, 419-20 (D. Minn. 1985). 
44. For a discussion of various defenses, see supra notes 10, 21-22 and accompanying 
text. 
158 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26 
II. THE RULE OF LIMITED LIABILITY AND EXPERIENCE UNDER CERCLA 
The traditional rule of American law is that, with some important 
exceptions, shareholders, officers and creditors of a corporation are not 
liable for corporate debts. Since CERCLA's adoption eleven years ago, 
the federal courts have decided many cases dealing directly and indirectly 
with the liability of controlling persons for response costs, but they have 
failed to agree on standards for such liability. 
A. The General Rule of Limited Liability 
A shareholder is generally not liable for the debts of a corporation 
beyond the shareholder's investment in that corporation.45 Although a 
parent corporation-a corporation that owns all or most of the stock of 
another corporation-is arguably different from an individual minority 
shareholder, the law generally affords limited liability to parents.46 Ex-
ceptions to this general rule have long been recognized, but the parame-
ters of these exceptions are hazy. Some courts vaguely state that piercing 
the corporate veil is appropriate "whenever necessary to prevent fraud or 
achieve equity."47 Other formulations are hardly more helpful. A parent 
may be held liable when it "dominates" or is the "alter ego" of the sub-
sidiary.48 Disregard of corporate formalities is common in piercing cases 
but does not appear to be a necessary or sufficient condition for pierc-
ing.49 Courts frequently mention inadequate capital in piercing cases, but 
capital deficiency alone almost never triggers piercing. 50 A parent may 
also be liable for participating in the commission of a tort by its subsidi-
ary. It is unclear, however, when a parent so far exceeds ordinary over-
sight by a controlling shareholder as to become a "participant."51 
Because these liability standards are so vague, piercing cases are 
heavily fact-oriented. Further, although courts often use the same verbal 
45. See Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act§ 6.22; H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAws OF CoRPO-
RATIONS § 73, at 130-31 (3d ed. 1983) [hereinafter H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER]. This rule of 
limited liability is firmly established and has even been called "the greatest single discovery 
of modern times" by former Columbia University president Nicholas Murray Butler. Mein-
ers, Mofsky & Tollison, Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability, 4 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 351, 351 
(1979). 
46. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 45, § 148, at 355. 
47. Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 417, 223 N.E.2d 6, 7, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585, 587 
(1966) (quoting International Aircraft Trading Co. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 279 N.Y. 
285, 292, 79 N.E.2d 249, 252 (1948)). 
48. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 45, § 146, at 344 n.2; R. CLARK, CoRPO-
RATE LAW § 2.4, at 71-72 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter R. CLARK]. 
49. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 45, § 146, at 347; R. CLARK, supra note 
48, § 2.4, at 72-73 n.4. 
50. See R. CLARK, supra note 48, § "2.4.1~ at 74. 
51. "An officer who commits or participates in the commission of a tort is, of course, 
personally liable to the victim for any resulting damage." H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra 
note 45, § 230, at 608. This is an example of the general rule that people are liable for torts 
they commit or in which they participate, even though they are acting on behalf of, or to-
gether with, others. Thus, the general rule applies to shareholders who participate in the 
commission of torts by a corporation. 
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standards in piercing cases, some courts are quicker than others to hold 
shareholders liable. Therefore, the outcome of a particular case is difficult 
to predict without detailed knowledge of the facts and of the attitudes of 
those on the court. In fact, prediction can be difficult even when these 
factors are known. 
B. The Case Law Under CERCLA 
The CERCLA cases concur that controlling person liability is a ques-
tion of federal law.52 Beyond that there is little agreement. The cases 
often use the traditional vocabulary of piercing, but also frequently men-
tion the legislative concerns underlying the statute. As a result, control-
ling person liability under CERCLA is broader than in most other areas. 
Results, however, still depend on the facts of each case and the attitudes 
of each court. 
1. Parent corporation liability 
Several cases hold that normal parent-subsidiary relationships alone 
do not render a parent liable for a subsidiary's CERCLA obligations.53 
Other cases state that a parent is liable if it has "capacity to control" the 
subsidiary.54 This standard would nearly always lead to liability because, 
by definition, a parent can control its subsidiary. The facts of most cases 
purporting to embrace the capacity-to-control standard, however, could 
warrant piercing under more traditional standards. 55 In contrast, some 
courts expressly reject the capacity-to-control test.56 
Some courts appear to base CERCLA liability only on a parent's ac-
52. For a discussion of federal common law in CERCLA cases, see supra note 32 and 
accompanying text. 
53. See generally Joslyn Mfg. Corp. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80 (5th·Cir. 1990) 
(liability denied after applying traditional piercing criteria); Wehner v. Syntex Agribusiness, 
Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (court refused to assert jurisdiction over parent whose 
control over its subsidiary did not exceed normal activities of parent); Accord United States · 
v. Bliss, 108 F.R.D. 127 (E.D. Mo. 1985). Similarly, some courts state that mere ability to 
control a facility does not make one a CERCLA "operator"; there must be actual control. 
For a discussion of cases requiring more than ability to control, see infra note 56. 
54. The capacity to control standard was first adopted by the District Court in United 
States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chern. Corp., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), modified, 
810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). A few other courts also 
followed that decision. See Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986); 
United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1202-04 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (denying summary 
judgment for defendant). 
55. See, e.g., Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 672 (D. Idaho 1986) (subsidi-
ary was undercapitalized and parent's approval was necessary for pollution control expenses 
over $500). 
56. See United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1990) (parent 
liability "requires more than merely complete ownership and the concomitant general au-
thority or ability to control"); Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. 1U Int'l Corp., 702 F. Supp 1384, 1390 
(N.D. Ill. 1988); United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20992, 21995-
97 (E.D. Pa. 1985); In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 675 F. Supp. 
22, 32-33 (D. Mass. 1987). 
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tive control of the subsidiary. 57 Although this standard seems more re-
strained than the capacity-to-control test, its scope is even more vague. It 
is unclear, for example, whether "active control" includes the routine ac-
tivities of parents, such as electing directors, consulting with managers, 
and monitoring performance, or whether greater involvement is required. 
Whether active control could apply to a minority shareholder if that 
shareholder exercised significant control over the affairs of a responsible 
corporation is also unsettled. 58 
A parent corporation can also be liable for directly participating in 
CERCLA violations. 59 In theory, this differs from liability under piercing 
because the parent is held directly liable for its own actions or status as 
owner and is not vicariously liable for the actions or status of its subsidi-
ary. In practice, however, the two can be hard to distinguish. The kind of 
participation in a CERCLA violation necessary to establish direct liability 
may differ little from the kind of involvement in the subsidiary's affairs 
necessary to pierce the veil,6° 
2. Liability of individual controlling shareholders 
The controlling shareholder of a responsible corporation may be an 
individual, or individuals, rather than another corporation. A parent cor-
poration may also be controlled by one or a few individuals. In either 
case, the individual shareholders could incur CERCLA liability. In. all 
such cases to date, the individuals have also been officers and directors of 
the corporation. Thus, discussion of these cases is deferred to the section 
on officers and directors. However, a few courts have said in dictum that 
an individual shareholder should be treated the same as a corporate 
shareholder under CERCLA.61 
57. See United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1203 (E.D. Pa. 1989). In 
Nicolet, the court reasoned that if the subsidiary is an "owner or operator" and the parent 
actively participates in the management of the subsidiary while the toxic substances are 
being handled, the parent is also an owner or operator. See also United States v. Kayser-
Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 22-23 (D.R.I. 1989), aff'd, 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990) (parent 
exercised pervasive control, including approval of system that used toxic substance); 
Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. IU lnt'l Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384, 1390 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (parent moni-
tored and approved subsidiary's compliance with environmental laws). Cf. In re Acushnet 
River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 675 F. Supp. 22, 32-33 (D. Mass. 1987) (parent 
liability rejected because pervasive control lacking). 
58. See United States v. McGraw-Edison Co., 718 F. Supp. 154, 156-58 (W.D.N.Y. 
1989) (denying summary judgment for 49% shareholder). 
59. See Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 671-72 (D. Idaho 1986). 
60. See id. In Bunker Hill, the court relied on the fact that the parent had to approve 
all of the subsidiary's capital expenditures for pollution controls in excess of $500. However, 
liability could have been based on the fact that the subsidiary was so undercapitalized as to 
possibly justify piercing even under traditional criteria. 
61. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985). 
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3. Officer and director liability 
Corporations are controlled by their officers as well as their share-
holders, but the types of control differ. Shareholders, in theory, enjoy ul-
timate control by electing corporate directors who in turn select the 
corporate officers. Mter election of directors, however, the shareholders' 
power to interfere in the firm's business is severely limited as authority to 
manage the company then passes to the board and the officers. 62 In prac-
tice, this separation of powers is even sharper. In the public corporation, 
control generally rests with the executive officers, who dominate the 
board rather than being dominated by it. Further, these officers are 
largely immune from interference by the shareholders even in the election 
of directors. 63 
Although corporate officers often control their firms, standards for 
their liability for the firm's debts are ill-defined both in general law and 
under CERCLA. It is well settled that an officer, or other employee, who 
commits a tort is not exempt from suit simply because he acted as an 
employee.64 Difficult questions can arise, however, in determining whether 
an officer authorized or proximately caused a tort. This determination is 
especially problematic when the participation consists of inadequately su-
pervising subordinate employees.66 The law here is particularly unsettled 
because plaintiffs rarely sue individual officers. 
The difficulties of officer and employee liability are compounded by 
the application of CERCLA's strict liability and joint and several liabil-
ity. At worst, an employee could be liable for a huge sum even though he 
was not negligent and did not participate in the CERCLA violation. Most 
courts have, however, rejected this draconian result. A majority of officers 
who have been held personally liable for CERCLA violations had actively 
pal"ticipated in the violation or were clearly negligent.66 If not active par-
62. See E. FoLK III, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CoRPORATION LAW 611-13 (1972). The 
shareholders' powers differ from state to state, but are almost always indirect. Shareholders 
can remove directors for cause, or sometimes without cause, and can amend the corporate 
by-laws and charter. In most states, however, a board resolution is a prerequisite to charter 
amendment. Shareholder approval is also often required for organic changes, such as merg-
ers and firm asset sales. Shareholders rarely can interfere directly with the day-to-day oper-
ations of the company. In general, the "business and affairs" of a corporation "shall be 
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors." DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 14l(a) 
{1983). 
63. See Dent, Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation, 
1989 Wis. L. REv. 881, 883-92. 
64. See REsTATEMENT {SECOND) oF AGENCY§ 343 {1958); J. BISHOP, LAW OF CoRPORATE 
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE 1f 3.13 {1982); Tundermann, Per-
sonal Liability for Corporate Directors, Officers, Employees and Controlling Shareholders 
Under State and Federal Environmental Laws, 31 RocKY MTN. L. INST. 2-1, 2-4-6 {1985). 
65. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF ToRTS § 26.3, at 1366-69 {1956). 
66. See United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chern. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 744 {8th 
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 {1987) {imposing liability for participation on vice 
president who knew about and supervised disposal of wastes); United States v. Northernaire 
Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742, 748 {W.D. Mich. 1987) {president and sole shareholder held 
liable because he was responsible for disposal); United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 
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ticipants in the CERCLA violation, officers held liable have generally 
been dominant shareholders active in the management of the responsible 
corporation.67 In these cases, officer status may have made little or no 
difference in determining liability. One court, however, has stated in dic-
tum that an officer can be liable simply because he had the power or au-
thority to prevent or abate the release. 68 
4. Lender liability 
Control of a corporation can be exerted by means other than stock 
ownership, corporate offices and directorships. A dominant customer, 
supplier, or labor union, for example, can enjoy influence tantamount to 
control. Lenders are most frequently accused of external control. CER-
CLA defines "owner or operator" to exclude "a person who, without par-
ticipating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of 
ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facil-
ity."6a Without this provision, the pledgee or mortgagee of a facility might 
be considered its owner and thus liable under CERCLA even if it played 
no role in managing the firm. 
The statute does not dictate how much participation is necessary to 
lose this exemption. It also leaves unclear the status of a lender who par-
ticipates in management but does not "hold indicia of ownership." The 
typical loan agreement imposes many restrictions on borrowers, but these 
restrictions rarely deal directly with waste disposal. Covenants often do 
1306 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (both plant supervisor and CEO had ultimate control over toxic dispo-
sal and held liable); United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 891-95 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (presi-
dent and principal shareholder held liable although officer did not initially know of illegal 
dumping contrary to his instructions, but allowed it to continue after he learned of prac-
tice); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1341 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (individual officers 
may be liable if they participate in CERCLA violations although defendants in case did not 
do so); Comment, Corporate Officer Liability for Hazardous Waste Disposal: What Are the 
Consequences?, 38 MERCER L. REV. 677 (1987). 
67. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1038-52 (2d Cir. 1985) (sole 
officer, shareholder, and decisionmaker held liable as "operator" under CERCLA); United 
States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 623-24 (D.N.H. 1988) (president held liable as owner of 
waste site and could not escape liability by incorporating his business). See also United 
States v. Pollution Abatement Servs., Inc., 763 F.2d 133, 134-35 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 
U.S. 1037 (1985) (two of four shareholder-officers held liable under Rivers and Harbors Ap-
propriations Act because they personally controlled firm's operations, including illegal 
dumping and storage activities); United States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 
187-88 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (vice-president and major shareholder found liable based on per-
sonal involvement in waste disposal); United States v. Carolawn, 21 Env. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 
2124, 2127 (D.S.C. 1984) (summary judgment for officers denied because of personal involve-
ment in disposals). But cf. United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293, 1300-
01 (5th Cir. 1976) (rejecting individual liability of officers under Rivers and Harbors Act 
because traditional piercing criteria not met); United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 526 
F.2d 1306, 1310 (5th Cir. 1976) (officer not held personally liable under Rivers and Harbors 
Act). 
68. Kelley ex ret. Michigan Natural Resources Comm'n v. ARCO Indus. Corp., 723 F. 
Supp. 1214, 1219-20 (W.D. Mich. 1989). 
69. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988). 
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require adherence to the law, however. These covenants should encourage 
sound hazardous waste disposal. 
Other common covenants require a borrower to maintain compliance 
with financial tests. These covenants could help assure the firm's ability 
to shoulder CERCLA costs. However, they could also prevent expendi-
tures needed to avoid or remedy toxic releases. It seems unlikely that this 
effect of financial covenants alone should render lenders liable. In United 
States v. Mirabile the court held that a lender's involvement in the finan-
cial aspects of a borrower's business, in contrast with its day-to-day af-
fairs, would not lead to liability.70 
In United States v. Fleet Factors,71 the Eleventh Circuit went fur-
ther. Although conceding that a mortgagee is not automatically an opera-
tor, the court stated that a lender's intervention in a borrower's business 
could render it liable as an owner even if the activity were not sufficient 
to make it an operator. The court stated that participation need only in-
dicate "a capacity to influence the corporation's treatment of hazardous 
wastes"; the secured creditor need not "actually involve itself in the day-
to-day operations of the facility."72 Fleet Factors' involvement in the 
debtor's business was limited to the usual lender activities until financial 
difficulties forced the borrower to cease operations. The Fleet Factors 
court did not specify when the lender became a CERCLA owner or opera-
tor.73 However, even if the CERCLA owner or operator did not assume 
responsibility until after operations ceased, the decision poses great risks 
because lenders routinely intervene when borrowers hit financial 
difficulties. 
In re Bergsoe Metal Corp. 74 takes a position quite different from 
Fleet Factors. The court noted the extensive rights of the secured credi-
70. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20992, 20995 (E.D. Pa. 1985). However, one 
creditor who had more actively participated in the management of the debtor was denied 
summary judgment on the issue of CERCLA liability. See also Guidice v. BFG Electroplat-
ing & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 561-62 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (lender-bank not liable for in-
volvement in financial affairs to protect its security interest); United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 
712 F. Supp. 1193, 1204-05 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (rr,ortgagee can be liable if it participates in the 
management and operations of the facility); Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. IU Int'l Corp., 702 F. 
Supp. 1384, 1390 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (no lender liability absent exercise of actual control); In re 
T.P. Long Chern. Inc., 45 Bankr. 278, 288 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (creditor not liable if he "holds 
indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security"). 
71. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 1991 WL 139893 (US) (US, Jan. 14, 
1991) (No. 9-504). 
72. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557. Under the facts of the case it was unnecessary to 
determine liability solely on the basis of financial involvement because the lender took part 
in operational decisions, including waste disposal, after the debtor had ceased to do business 
and began to wind down its operations. See also Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-
Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572-73 (5th Cir. 1988) (court affirmed denial of summary 
judgment to defendant alleged to be "owner" solely because it was lender); United States v. 
Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 576 (D. Md. 1986) (secured creditor exemp-
tion should be construed narrowly). 
73. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1555. 
74. 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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tor, but added that "nearly all secured creditors have these rights."75 The 
court said: "What is critical is not what rights the [creditor] had, but 
what it did . . . . Regardless of what rights the [creditor] may have had, 
it cannot have participated in management if it never exercised them."76 
This standard leaves unclear the status of a creditor forced by the 
debtor's difficulties to exercise its rights; creditors' rights are illusory if 
they cannot be exercised without incurring CERCLA liability. But if 
Bergsoe is followed, it at least relieves the creditor who does not exercise 
these rights. 
New issues arise if the creditor seizes the debtor's property. Mirabile 
held that a mortgagee does not become an "owner" for purposes of CER-
CLA when it purchases property on which it had foreclosed after opera-
tions had ceased and then merely protects the property against further 
decline. 77 Fleet Factors rejected this analysis. In Fleet Factors, the court 
ruled that "[w]hat is relevant is the nature and extent of the creditor's 
involvement with the facility, not its motive."78 Seizing a facility alone 
seems to entail the degree of involvement necessary for owner status 
under Fleet Factors. Moreover, Mirabile ignores the plain meaning of 
CERCLA imposing liability on an "owner"79 because the contractual rela-
tionship with the borrower seems to preclude any CERCLA third-party 
defense. 80 
III. TORTS AND THE RECEIVED THEORY OF LIMITED LIABILITY 
The general rule excusing shareholders from liability for the debts of 
a corporation and the exceptions to that rule are both of long standing. 
Only recently have commentators scrutinized the economic wisdom of 
75. Id. at 672. 
76. ld. at 672-73. 
77. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20994-97. 
78. 901 F.2d at 1560. 
79. A lender who forecloses on property would seem no longer to satisfy the exception 
in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988} for one who "holds indicia of ownership primarily to pro-
tect his security interest in the . . . facility." After foreclosure the lender becomes the full 
owner. The 1986 amendments to CERCLA exculpate an owner who acquires a facility after 
a release and, after "all appropriate inquiry," has no knowledge or reason to know toxic 
wastes are present. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (1988). A lender who forecloses a mortgage generally 
knows too much about the borrower to deny it had reason to know of its toxic wastes. See 
also United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 580 (D. Md. 1986} 
(statutory exception does not cover mortgagee who purchases mortgaged property at fore-
closure sale). 
80. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 580 (D. Md. 1986), 
held it an issue of fact whether this defense applied to a mortgagee who purchased the 
mortgaged property at a foreclosure sale. The material issues of fact involved the relation-
ship between the bank and the borrower as well as the reasonableness of the bank's conduct; 
The bank's undeniable contractual relationship with the borrower seems to preclude the 
third-party defense. However, Maryland Bank & Trust suggests that the contractual rela-
tionship may end with foreclosure. I d. at 581. Even if these defenses are available, the mort-
gagee-purchaser would have to show that after purchase of the property it "exercised due 
care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3)(a) (1988). 
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these positions. Most of that scrutiny has focused on contract debts. 
Deeper analysis of immunity from tort liability is needed. 
Limited shareholder liability is frequently explained as the optimal 
hypothetical bargain; that is, the bargain that most creditors and share-
holders would strike if they could negotiate at no cost.81 Under this view, 
limited liability spreads risks among risk-averse participants: Sharehold-
ers risk their investment while creditors shoulder the remaining risk. 
Creditors benefit from this because shareholders are encouraged to seek 
credit. Theoretically, the creditors' gain in profitable transactions out-
weighs the costs of not being able to sue shareholders personally when the 
corporation cannot pay its debts. If creditors fear the risk is too great in a 
particular case, they can demand security, such as a shareholder guar-
anty, which in effect waives limited liability, or deny credit. 
This rationale fails in the tort context, however. Most potential tort 
victims, including victims of toxic spills, have no opportunity to negotiate 
with potential tortfeasors. Not surprisingly, courts prefer to pierce the 
corporate veil in tort cases rather than in contract cases.82 
There are also affirmative reasons for shareholder liability for a cor-
poration's torts. First, liability deters negligence. Those who are not liable 
for injuries they cause have no economic incentive to be prudent and may 
inflict serious avoidable injuries. If liable for the injuries they inflict, ra-
tional people exercise reasonable care to avoid causing harm. 83 Similarly, 
imposing liability for injuries one causes promotes allocative efficiency. If 
such liability is not imposed, activities do not bear their costs and will be 
overutilized. For example, if coal powered generators produce more pollu-
tion than nuclear generators, but operators are not liable for the pollu-
tion's damages, there will be more coal and fewer nuclear generators than 
is economically desirable. 84 
Limited shareholder liability engenders these same problems. Share-
holders can enjoy profits from an enterprise yet avoid its debts if tort 
liability bankrupts the firm. Shareholders thus have an inadequate incen-
tive to make sure the corporation is reasonably cautious and financially 
sound. Likewise, activity by such corporations will be too risky. Limited 
liability also encourages shareholders to drain capital from a corporation 
81. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 
702-03 (1982) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control]. 
82. See, e.g., Edwards Co. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., 730 F.2d 977, 980-84 (5th Cir. 
1984) (en bane); Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 89, 112 (1985); Roe, Corporate Strategic Reaction to Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REV. 1, 42 
n.l18 (1986) [hereinafter Roe]. But see H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 45, § 146, at 
348 ("[c]ourts usually cite contract and tort cases indiscriminately as precedents"). 
83. Negligence and its complement, reasonable prudence, are usually determined in 
economic terms according to whether "the expected damage outweighs the costs of preven-
tion." Roe, supra note 79, at 45. See also Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure 
and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL. STUD. 
689, 692-705 (1985) [hereinafter Schwartz]. 
84. See A. PoLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND EcoNOMICS 89-91 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter A. PoLINSKY]. Correlatively, if producers are charged for excessive liability, their goods or 
services will be overpriced and underconsumed. 
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and then take risky actions. A company can take opportunities with nega-
tive net present value because the shareholders will enjoy gains if the 
venture succeeds. The firm's creditors, however, will bear most of the loss 
if the venture fails. Because such behavior is inefficient, commentators 
would withdraw limited liability in such cases. 8~ 
Second, broad liability is preferred in order to spread the risks of 
loss. Many people each paying a little can more easily bear the cost of 
injuries than the few who are injured.86 Similarly, liability should fall on 
the party best able to insure because insurance broadly spreads the risk 
of loss.87 Firms that cause accidents generally can insure more easily than 
potential victims. Limited liability undermines these principles. Because 
a corporation and its shareholders escape liability when the firm becomes 
bankrupt, firms have inadequate incentives to build the costs of either 
reserving or insuring against tort liability into the prices they charge. 
Firms reserving such costs would suffer a competitive disadvantage.88 
Holding shareholders liable prevents them from leaving victims remedi-
less, thereby restoring the incentive to insure. The costs of accidents are 
then built into the firm's prices and spread as widely as possible. 
Limited shareholder liability is also explained as facilitating public 
investment, diversification of portfolios, and transferability of stock.80 
These arguments are irrelevant for majority shareholders, who are not 
passive public investors, do not seek maximum diversification of portfo-
lios, and do not trade their stock in impersonal markets. The cases seem 
to recognize that controlling shareholders should be treated differently 
for purposes of limited liability. Majority owners are often held liable for 
corporate debts; however, minority shareholders are almost never held li-
able for corporate debts.90 Some commentators question whether limited 
85. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control, supra note 81, at 113. 
86. See G. CALABRESI, THE CosTs OF AcciDENTS: A LEGAL AND EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS 35-
129 (1970); Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REv. 444, 450-60 (1923) [hereinafter 
Smith]. 
87. See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 
YALE L.J. 499, 500-02, 543-44 (1961); Smith, supra note 86, at 456-60. 
88. To some extent this effect is countered by the spreading of risks to creditors under 
limited liability. Further, some creditors can monitor the corporation and curb its risky be-
havior better than public shareholders. This is true only for contract creditors. Leaving the 
claims of tort victims unsatisfied generally reduces risk-spreading, and tort victims usually 
cannot monitor or influence a corporation's risky behavior. Conversely, controlling share-
holders can monitor and influence the company's risk-taking better than tort victims. 
89. See Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 
499, 502-13 (1976); Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control, supra note 81, at 89-97. Eas-
terbrook and Fischel argue that limited liability reduces the investor's need to monitor be-
cause only his investment, not his entire wealth, is at risk. Id. at 94-95. Diversification is 
promoted because additional investments reduce rather than increase risk. By contrast, 
under unlimited liability each new investment would add a threat to the investor's entire 
fortune. Id. at 96-97. 
90. The corporations' codes generally make no distinction between majority and mi-
nority shareholders. Courts, however, do not pierce unless the shareholder exerts domina-
tion which is "substantially more than the control which would be exercised by any majority 
shareholder." Krendl & Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Focusing the Inquiry, 55 DEN. 
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liability should extend to corporate as well as individual shareholders. 
They view a parent and its subsidiaries as a single economic enterprise. 
Treating them as legally separate entities facilitates shareholder oppor-
tunism at the expense of the creditors. Accordingly, these commentators 
argue that the law should generally treat a parent and its subsidiaries as 
one.91 The argument in favor of treating parents and subsidiaries as one is 
not persuasive. Because most corporations are risk averse,92 they may 
forgo opportunities with positive net present value93 if they must place 
the entire firm at risk. A company will take such an opportunity, how-
ever, if it can isolate the risk in a subsidiary. Moreover, denying limited 
liability to parent corporations would create an anomaly: An individual 
majority shareholder would enjoy limited liability, but that immunity 
would vanish if control were sold to a corporation. Thus, stripping corpo-
rate parents of limited liability would discourage economically beneficial 
sales of assets. Therefore, individuals and corporate shareholders are 
equally deserving of limited liability. 
The limited liability of corporate officers, directors, and lenders for 
tort receives even less attention than that of shareholders, probably be-
cause these parties are so rarely sued individually. Although executives 
and lenders can be liable for active participation in corporate torts, 94 tort 
victims generally refuse to sue them. The corporation usually has insur-
ance and deeper pockets than the executives. Thus, suing the individuals 
is superfluous. Further, lenders rarely participate in the commission of 
torts by borrowers. Executives and lenders have been sued in many CER-
CLA cases. However, most are sued because of their control of the com-
pany rather than their participation in the violation. 95 The immensity of 
CERCLA liabilities and deliberately meager resources of many responsi-
ble corporations explains many of these suits. 
The reasons for exempting executives and lenders from liability un-
less they have participated in a tort are not immediately apparent. The 
corporation's legal separateness is only a fiction. Shareholder liability in 
the piercing cases shows that courts sometimes disregard that fiction. Ex-
ecutives and lenders as well as shareholders can control a company. In-
deed, the executives' cooperation is indispensable to corporate action. 
L.J. 1, 16, 25-27 (1978). 
91. See generally Landers, Another Word on Parents, Subsidiaries and Affiliates in 
Bankruptcy, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 527 (1976); Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent, Subsid-
iary, and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 589 (1975). When limited 
liability began, state laws forbade corporations to own stock. Once corporate share owner-
ship was permitted, however, limited liability followed without much thought or debate. See 
Roe, supra note 82, at 46-48. 
92. For a discussion of risk aversion, see infra note 117. 
93. For an explanation of the concepts of present value and net present value, see R. 
BREALY & 8. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CoRPORATE FINANCE 12-14 (1981) (hereinafter R. BREALY 
& S. MEYERS]. 
94. For a discussion of officer liability, see supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text. 
95. For a discussion of ownership for CERCLA purposes, see supra notes 44, 70, 72-80 
and accompanying text. 
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Executives and lenders also share the firm's profits with the stockholders. 
If shareholders should be liable for a corporation's CERCLA obligations, 
arguably the officers, directors, and lenders also should be liable. 
In sum, the theory of limited liability does not encompass majority 
shareholders, officers, directors, or lenders of companies with tort liabili-
ties. Rather, the goals of loss-spreading and deterring torts, including 
toxic spills, argue for liability of all those who share in the corporation's 
income and can influence its activities. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
courts have forced CERCLA liability upon these parties despite the ab-
sence of clear statutory authority. If CERCLA liability for all who exer-
cise some control is not to be the general rule, new reasons for limiting 
liability must be developed. 
IV. LIMITED LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA 
Although liability in tort for controlling shareholders, executives, and 
lenders may be wise, several distinct features of the environmental laws 
suggest a measure of immunity. 
A. Excessive Liability and Distorted Corporate Incentives 
The first of the two principal arguments against limited liability in 
tort is that it distorts incentives, inviting enterprises to be negligent. If 
owners are not liable for a firm's debts, they can minimize the firm's capi-
tal and disregard the potential costs of accidents to the extent that these 
c~sts exceed the firm's net worth. This is possible because accident costs 
will be borne by the victims, not by the owners. Any firm that pays more 
for safety will suffer a competitive disadvantage. Limited liability also 
causes allocative distortions by "encourag[ing] investment in inefficient 
ventures"96 and stimulating excessive investment in industries that es-
cape the costs of accidents they cause. Shareholder liability, however, 
makes owners bear the costs of accidents and thus creates the incentives 
to invest in safety until the costs of additional investments equal the 
costs of injuries avoided. 
The distorted-incentives a_qalysis assumes that unlimited liability 
compels the enterprise and its owners to pay for injuries caused by their 
activities but not more. The assumption is crucial because efficiency re-
quires that activities bear only their costs. Imposing liability for more 
than the damage caused is inefficient because it deters enterprises from 
undertaking transactions that are economically beneficial.97 
CERCLA, like other environmental laws, often imposes excessive lia-
bility. First, CERCLA liability is measured not according to the environ-
mental damage done by a toxic spill, but according to the cost of cleaning 
it up.98 Thus, the EPA may order a cleanup even if the benefits of 
96. Note, Parent Liability, supra note 32, at 989. 
97. "Efficient" behavior is generally defined as "behavior that maximizes aggregate 
benefits less aggregate costs." A PoLINSKY, supra note 84, at 117. 
98. For a discussion of cleanup costs, see supra notes 3, 8. 
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cleanup do not exceed the costs.99 The EPA may, therefore, demand a 
costly cleanup for a spill that threatens very little actual damage. 
CERCLA liability is also joint and several.100 One who contributes 
only a fraction of a release may have to pay a much larger share, or even 
the entire cost, of a cleanup.101 This problem is aggravated by CERCLA's 
provisions barring contribution in some cases.102 CERCLA defendants can 
also incur substantial litigation costs, even if the defendant is exoner-
ated.105 Further, civil liability and litigation costs under CERCLA are not 
the only sanction for causing environmental harm. Many state and fed-
eral environmental laws impose fines and penalties upon responsible par-
ties.104 Thus a firm's liability may far exceed the harm it causes by any 
release of wastes. This liability leads industrial enterprises to be overly 
cautious. Firms will also reject undertakings in the United States106 that 
would be profitable but for the threat of excessive CERCLA liability. 
CERCLA imposes liability for toxic spills that occurred before the 
firm owned or operated the relevant facility. 106 This successor liability 
cannot be justified as deterring the release because the purchaser had no 
control over it. Does purchaser liability improve incentives in other ways? 
If a purchaser knows how much CERCLA liability will be, it can reduce 
the purchase price for the facility by that amount. The cleanup cost is 
then properly borne by the owner at the time of the release. However, the 
purchaser may not know of the extent or even the existence of CERCLA 
liability. Further, a buyer cannot exempt itself from liability in the 
purchase contract. 107 A right of indemnity from the seller is also meaning-
less if the seller is dead, defunct, or unable to pay. 
Purchaser liability can make desirable transactions economically dif-
ficult or impossible. If the CERCLA cleanup costs exceed a facility's eco-
99. Although the EPA uses some form of cost-benefit analysis in handling toxic spills, 
it need not and does not always do so. See supra note 8. 
100. For a discussion of damage divisibility, see supra notes 9-10. 
101. Joint and several liability complicates insurance against environmental liabilities 
by making it virtually impossible for an insurer to measure an insured's potential liability. 
See Note, Encou.raging Safety Through Insurance-Based Incentives: Financial Responsi-
bility for Hazardous Wastes, 96 YALE L.J. 403, 419 (1986). Even if the insured generates 
little hazardous waste, it could incur huge liability if that waste is improperly disposed of at 
a facility containing other hazardous wastes. 
102. Parties who settle with the government are exempt from actions for contribution. 
42 US.C. § 9622(b)(4) (1988). Hence, a party that does not settle may be held liable for a 
disproportionate share of the cleanup costs and yet have no right of contribution from other 
defendants. 
103. CERCLA litigation often includes both defending suits for reponse costs and de-
fending actions for contribution or indemnification. 
104. For a discussion of potential penalties and fines under CERCLA, see supra notes 
24-26 and accompanying text. 
105. Excessive liability encourages the chemical industry to avoid CERCLA by moving 
to other countries. 
106. For a discussion of potential innocent purchaser liability, see supra note 22 and 
accompanying text. 
107. CERCLA provides that any such exemption from liability is void and unenforce-
able. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e) (1988). 
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nomic value, no rational buyer will purchase it, even though society might 
benefit from a sale. Fortunately, CERCLA now provides a defense for an 
innocent purchaser.108 If this defense requires only a reasonable investiga-
tion by the purchaser, it goes far toward solving the problem of excessive 
liability for potential buyers. However, the statute which sets forth the 
defense indicates that the defense is narrow. The statute requires not just 
a reasonable investigation but "all appropriate inquiry." The tendency of 
courts to read CERCLA liability as broadly as possible further suggests 
that the defense will be read narrowly.109 
Is it wise to demand a careful investigation by an acquirer? The ben-
efit of such an inquiry is that it may prevent an owner who knows about a 
spill from selling to an unknowing purchaser and then disappearing. If 
the acquirer is not liable, the government may have to bear the loss. Even 
without CERCLA, an acquirer has some incentive to investigate in order 
to avoid purchasing contaminated facilities. Apart from preventing a 
seller from escaping CERCLA liability, any additional caution motivated 
by fear of CERCLA liability generates no social benefit. Since the likeli-
hood of such a benefit is small,110 any additional investigation is likely to 
be wasteful. 
Further, CERCLA's innocent purchaser exemption does not help 
where the purchaser knows of the contamination and knows that the cost 
of cleaning it up exceeds the value of the property. The Act in effect for-
bids a sale in such cases, although such a prohibition creates no benefit. 
Joint and several liability, purchaser liability, and the absence of 
cost-benefit limits on cleanups are not necessary features of a reasonable 
scheme of toxic waste regulation. The proposed European Community 
standards on toxic wastes dispense with or curtail all these features.m 
So far the problem of excessive caution has been discussed in the 
context of firm liability. Controlling person immunity confines the risk of 
liability to the firm's equity. This equity can be drained to a minimum, 
thereby vitiating the deterrent threat of liability. Even if CERCLA im-
poses excessive liability, control persons will still cause the firm to be im-
prudent if they are personally immune from liability. Thus, controlling 
person immunity is arguably unwise even if CERCLA imposes excessive 
liability. 
Controlling person liability exacerbates the problems of excessive lia-
108. For a discussion of potential innocent purchaser liability, see supra note 22. 
109. Compare, for example, the narrow reading of the exception for mortgage lenders. 
See supra notes 69-80 and accompanying text. 
110. More precisely, the anticipated benefit is the product of (1) the probability that 
the facility has toxic waste, (2) the CERCLA response costs if the property is contaminated, 
(3) the probability that the seller will avoid the CERCLA liability, and (4) the probability 
that additional investigation by the buyer will discover the forgoing. Although the antici-
pated benefit will then vary depending on what the purchaser knows in each case, in most 
cases the anticipated benefit will be very small. 
111. See Freeman & McSlarrow, The Proposed European Community Directive on 
Civil Liability for Waste-The Implications for U.S. Superfund Reauthorization in 1991, 
46 Bus. LAw. 1, 5-7, 20 (1990). 
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bility. If control persons can avoid excessive liability by incorporating, the 
problem of excessive caution will be small. Holding control persons liable, 
though, discourages economically desirable activity and distorts the struc-
ture of firms in the relevant industry.112 
Similarly, controlling person liability aggravates the problem of pur-
chaser liability. With limited liability, a facility can be purchased through 
a thinly capitalized subsidiary. Thus, the assets of the parent are not at 
risk for any unknown CERCLA liability. Shareholder liability forces the 
owners to accept the risk of CERCLA response costs. If these costs are 
unknown and possibly excessive, the purchase may not be made even 
though the transaction would be economically beneficial to society. 
Both excessive liability and insufficient liability are threats. Which 
threat is greater is uncertain. The huge estimates of potential CERCLA 
liability suggest that the problems of excessive liability may well outweigh 
the benefits to firms of evading liability. 113 Moreover, critics of limited 
liability improperly assume that the possibility of ducking CERCLA lia-
bility affects everyone equally. Legitimate, risk-averse businesses do not 
readily evade the law. Evasion of CERCLA liability will be exploited pri-
marily by criminal enterprises. Thus, CERCLA will invite penetration of 
the chemical industry by criminals. Indeed, it has already done so. 114 
B. Risk-Spreading, Risk-Aversion, and Insurance 
The second principal argument for shareholder liability for torts is 
that the costs of accidents should be spread as widely as possible. 115 
Holding shareholders liable encourages them to insure either personally 
or through the firm. 116 The costs of liability or insurance are then built 
into the prices that firms in each industry charge for their goods and ser-
vices. The risk-spreading analysis goes beyond the argument that share-
holder liability induces reasonable caution. Under a risk-spreading 
theory, a firm is liable for costs even when it exercises reasonable caution. 
The firm's superior ability to spread costs justifies the theory. This leads 
to strict liability under some environmental laws, including CERCLA. 
Risk-spreading improves efficiency if investors are risk-neutral or if 
they can insure against the risk. However, investors are risk-averse,117 and 
112. For a discussion of shareholder liability, see infra notes 122-24 and accompanying 
text. 
113. For a discussion of the extent of liability, see supra notes 2, 24-26 and accompa-
nying text. 
114. For a discussion of criminal involvement in waste disposal, see infra note 132 and 
accompanying text. 
115. For a discussion of risk spreading, see supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. 
116. For a discussion of shareholders' incentive to insure, see supra text accompanying 
notes 87-88. 
117. See Note, Parental Liability, supra note 32, at 989 n.3 (citing K. ARROW, EsSAYS 
IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 90-120 (1971)). It is sometimes argued that corporations 
are not risk averse. Id at 989. Perhaps corporations should be risk neutral on the theory that 
investors can avoid risk if they wish by diversifying their own portfolios. See R. BREALY & S. 
MYERS, supra note 90, at 22. However, corporations in fact are risk averse, as demonstrated 
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currently insurance for CERCLA and similar liability is not widely availa-
ble. Huge potential CERCLA liability may frighten investors away from 
opportunities with positive net present value. Consider, for example, the 
CEO of a $250 million firm weighing the acquisition of a company that is 
worth $50 million but for a 10% chance that it will incur a $300 million 
CERCLA liability. A risk-neutral investor would value this risk 
probabilistically at $30 million, and thus would pay up to $20 million for 
the company. A diversified investor may weigh this risk neutrally, but 
most executives will not. If the $300 million CERCLA liability occurs it 
will bankrupt the acquiring firm. This means a 10% chance that the exec-
utive's stock in the acquiring firm, probably a large part of his personal 
wealth, will be eliminated and his compensation radically reduced. The 
CEO also risks the loss of his job. Although this opportunity would ap-
peal to diversified investors, it would repel the CEO personally, even if he 
were personally risk-neutral. Like most rational people, the executive 
probably is not risk-neutral, but is risk-averse. 118 
Extending liability to controlling persons aggravates this problem. If 
the executive can be personally liable for the CERCLA cleanup because 
of her office or shareholdings, she risks not only her compensation, the 
value of her stock, and possibly her job, but also personal liability far 
beyond her means. Few rational people will knowingly take that risk. 
A solution to the executive's dilemma would be to acquire the com-
pany and insure against the CERCLA liability. However, if CERCLA in-
surance is available at all its expense may render such an acquisition 
unprofitable. Further, CERCLA insurance is often unavailable at any 
price. The lack of insurance is especially problematic because CERCLA 
liability can be so large. Owners may accept uninsured risks of moderate 
size even if they are mildly risk-averse. Few investors, however, will ac-
cept the risk of uninsured CERCLA liability. 
The problem of risk-aversion may be manageable when a firm's risks 
are reasonably ascertainable.119 The risks of waste disposal are notori-
by their inclination to insure and to undertake mergers that do not increase the firm's value 
in order to reduce risk through diversification. Perhaps companies can diversify more inex-
pensively and more effectively than individual shareholders. See R. GILSON, THE LAw AND 
FINANCE OF CORPORATE AcQUISITIONS 352 (1986). Even if this explanation is not persuasive, 
corporate officers do seek to reduce risk at the company level because their fortunes are 
closely tied to the firm's. 
118. It is sometimes suggested that "the effect of managers' risk aversion on corporate 
decisionmaking is constrained by the disciplinary actions of shareholders, the labor market, 
and the capital market." Note, Parental Liability, supra note 32, at 990 n.27 (citing Fama, 
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. PoL. EcoN. 288, 291-92 (1980)). These 
constraints are deeply flawed, however, and leave managers considerable discretion. See 
Dent, supra note 63, at 884-90. See also S. SHAVELL, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF AcciDENT LAw 
189-90 (1987) [hereinafter S. SHAVELL] (diversified shareholders may be risk-neutral, but 
others in firms are not). 
119. Professor Schwartz defines a "knowable risk" as a "risk that a product is as dan-
gerous as a firm would predict on the basis of doing the cost-effective amount of research, or 
less dangerous." Schwartz, supra note 83, at 691. 
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ously unpredictable, however. 120 Theoretically, the executive in the hypo-
thetical might take the opportunity if her company were larger and the 
opportunity sufficiently profitable. If the company is large, it can take 
many known risks and accurately predict how many of these risks will 
produce losses. If the probability of each risk is unknown, overall predic-
tions become impossible. Even if risks are unpredictable, a risk-neutral 
investor might accept the uncertainty in exchange for the possibility of 
high returns. Like most people, however, the executive is risk-averse. She 
will probably shun the risks of any activity that might incur CERCLA 
liability. 121 
The uncertainty of environmental liability is compounded by the fear 
that Congress will not only change the rules but change them retroac-
tively. CERCLA liability is now retroactive.122 This may be unfair be-
cause retroactive liability cannot deter behavior that has already 
occurred. By imposing retroactive liability once, however, Congress and 
the courts have instilled anxiety that they will do so again. Entrepreneurs 
should realize that actions legal today may subject them to liability to-
morrow. This inherent possibility cannot be quantified. 
Although uncertainty is a problem even under limited liability, 
shareholder liability accentuates this problem. With limited liability the 
controlling person's uncertainty is limited to his investment in the firm. 
Although the probability of loss is not known, the amount of loss is 
capped. Shareholders can shrink the uncertainty by reducing the firm's 
equity. Holding shareholders liable forecloses this approach, forcing them 
to abandon opportunities with high risk and uncertainty. 
How much the uncertainty bred by CERCLA liability discourages ac-
tivity in the chemical industry cannot be determined precisely, but the 
disappearance of environmental insurance is telling. Insurers absorb a 
risk by spreading it over so many policies that the total uncertainty for 
most kinds of risks is reduced almost to zero. Only in rare cases is uncer-
tainty so great that insurers will not pay for it. CERCLA presents such a 
rare case. 
Although the forgoing discussion demonstrates that shareholder lia-
bility spreads the risks of CERCLA costs imperfectly, shareholder liabil-
ity still might be better than forcing cleanup costs on the victims of 
contamination. If firms and controlling shareholders are imperfect risk-
spreaders, they still are better risk-spreaders than most victims.123 Under 
120. See id. at 690 (the "existence and extent of the harms [of toxic risks] are difficult 
to predict"). 
121. This might not be true if the executive were confident that CERCLA cleanup 
action would not occur for many years. Managers sometimes take unreasonable risks if they 
believe that losses will not be incurred until after they have retired. Schwartz, supra note 
83, at 712. Although CERCLA liability can be delayed, a manager cannot safely predict such 
a delay. 
122. For a discussion of CERCLA's retroactivity, see supra note 20. 
123. This assumption is not always valid. For many environmental injuries the victims 
!jl'e numerous. In certain cases, the shareholders of a firm held liable may be less numerous 
(and no more wealthy), than the victims. Liability could turn on the number of sharehold-
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CERCLA, the alternative to shareholder liability is EPA payment of the 
costs of cleanup. The federal government is a better risk-spreader than 
even the largest firm. 
Government payment for CERCLA cleanups may be politically unac-
ceptable. It is also allocatively inefficient because it frees the chemical 
industry of the costs of its own activities. As an alternative, the EPA 
could run an insurance program by paying CERCLA costs from a special 
tax on the chemical industry. This approach solves the problems of the 
unavailability of private insurance and of the allocative inefficiency of 
government payment of CERCLA costs. It is also eminently feasible be-
cause CERCLA provides for just such a tax.124 Thus, the risk-spreading 
argument for shareholder liability under CERCLA seems to collapse 
completely. 
C. Limited Liability and Firm Structure 
The argument that shareholder liability encourages prudence and 
spreads the costs of accidents assumes that shareholder liability does not 
alter the financial structure of firms. That is, it assumes that firms will 
remain as solvent as under limited liability and that shareholders simply 
will be added as a new source of liability. 
These assumptions are false. Even if shareholders are liable, their 
risk is limited by insolvency. They still can escape liability by declaring 
bankruptcy. 125 This creates an incentive to vest chemical firms in less 
wealthy hands. Consider an undertaking that eventually may incur large 
CERCLA liability. To a group of individuals of modest means, the threat 
of CERCLA liability is relatively unimportant. If held liable, they can 
declare bankruptcy without great hardship because most of their belong-
ings will be exempt from creditors.126 Even if insurance were available, 
they might forgo it because they have little to protect.127 
A large company considering the same opportunity could not disre-
gard CERCLA liability so easily. It must weigh that liability to the point 
of its own bankruptcy; that is, up to its net worth. Further, because of 
joint and several liability and the EPA's practice of pursuing deep pock-
ets, the large firm must anticipate that it will probably have to bear more 
than its share of a major spill, while the impecunious firm may reasonably 
ers, but that would further discourage participation by large firms in the industries subject 
to CERCLA liability. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
124. Under 26 U.S.C. § 9507 {1988) the Hazardous Substance Superfund is funded by 
among other sources, taxes imposed on the production and importation of oil and petroleum 
and chemical products under 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611, 4661, and 4671 {1988). 
125. See Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 278-84 {1985) {liability to pay money under 
federal environmental laws can be discharged in bankruptcy). Compare Midlantic Nat'! 
Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 507 {1986) {bankruptcy trustee 
held forbidden to abandon property in contravention of state law). 
126. See S. SHAVELL, supra note 118, at 167 {tortfeasors consider liability only to the 
extent of their assets). 
127. S. SHAVELL, supra note 118 at 240 {people may not insure if their assets are less 
than the liability they may incur). 
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expect that it will have to pay little or not be sued at all. Moreover, the 
threat to management's compensation and job security may make a large, 
E?table firm shun even profitable opportunities.128 With unlimited liability, 
the firm could not avoid this risk by placing the opportunity in a 
subsidiary. 
Similarly, shareholder liability encourages owners of a firm fearing 
large liability to siphon off and spend firm assets before that liability ma-
terializes. The owners' CERCLA liability is limited by bankruptcy. 
Therefore, money already spent or transformed into exempt assets ordi-
narily cannot be reached.129 At least the shareholders are no worse off for 
siphoning assets from the firm. CERCLA encourages this behavior more 
than other liability risks because it is often of large magnitude and usu-
ally is incurred long after a release. Thus, after a spill, a firm's owners 
may have years to drain and spend assets before facing liability. 
Congress apparently recognized the problem of asset draining and 
tried to counter it with broad joint and several liability. Generators of 
toxic waste have reason to see that those hired to transport and dispose 
of toxic waste do the job properly and are financially responsible because 
generators share the liability for any spill.130 However, generators have 
difficulty efficiently monitoring disposers. Overseeing disposal is challeng-
ing and costly. Further, ensuring the continuing financial responsibility of 
the disposer long after the disposal is virtually impossible. Therefore, 
Congress' attempt to assure prudence and financial responsibility by hav-
ing different firms monitor each other appears to fail. Unfortunately, this 
threat of uncontrollable liability for acts of others operates in favor of 
financially irresponsible firms. 
If this critique is accurate, one would predict that an abnormally 
large number of firms with potential CERCLA liability would be small 
and financially weak. One would further assume that these firms would 
make large payouts, then dissolve and abandon contaminated facilities. In 
practice, this seems to be what is happening.131 
128. For a discussion of risk aversion, see supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text. 
129. A trustee in bankruptcy may avoid any transfer: made "with actual intent to hin-
der, delay, or defraud" creditors, made for "less than a reasonably equivalent value" when 
the debtor was insolvent or had "an unreasonably small capital," or made when the debtor 
expected to "incur ... debts that would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts 
matured." 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1990). It can be difficult to prove that a transfer falls within 
this provision, however. See Shanker, What Every Lawyer Should Know About the Law of 
Fraudulent Transfers, 31 PRAC. LAW. 43, 48-55 (1985). 
130. For a discussion of those liable under CERCLA, see supra notes 6-7, 18 and ac-
companying text. Liability for a spill extends not only to the generator's waste but also to 
any waste others mix with it. See supra notes 9-10, 39 and accompanying text. 
131. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, TENTH ANNUAL REPORT 174 (1979) 
(500-800 waste sites have been abandoned); Note, Cleaning Up Bankruptcy: Curbing the 
Abuse of the Federal Bankruptcy Code by Industrial Polluters, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 870, 871 
n.14 (1985) (with increasing frequency bankruptcy has been used to avoid environmental 
liabilities). Cf. Schwartz, supra note 80, at 724 (discussing high dividend payouts by Johns-
Manville, apparently to evade future asbestosis claims). This analysis might also predict 
that an inordinate number of publicly held companies would incur CERCLA liability on the 
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Criminal involvement is a related problem. Proper toxic waste dispo-
sal primarily benefits the public, not the payor. The legal difficulties and 
high costs of waste disposal attract criminals who take high fees and do 
the job inexpensively and illegally. Potential civil liability is a cost for 
law-abiding, well-financed firms, but not for criminals who conspire to 
evade such liability. As a result, legitimate firms suffer a competitive dis-
advantage. The larger the CERCLA liability, the larger the disadvantage 
for honest firms. Shareholder liability increases this disadvantage by ex-
tending the risk to law-abiding owners. Evidence suggests that these re-
sults have occurred. Organized crime, and perhaps unorganized crime as 
well, has heavily infiltrated the toxic waste disposal industry. 132 CERCLA 
liability, although intended to deter polluters, may very well defeat its 
own purposes by forcing legitimate firms out of the chemical industry in 
favor of illegitimate, criminally-controlled firms. 
D. Controlling Person Liability and the Volume of Litigation 
Proponents of controlling person liability argue that it reduces litiga-
tion by providing government a deep pocket from which to recover re-
sponse costs and facilitating settlement of CERCLA claims. 133 Although 
the government may find it convenient to pursue controlling persons as 
deep pockets, the latter may take steps to avoid liability. These steps 
could make CERCLA recovery more difficult than under traditional stan-
dards of piercing. As previously explained, holding controlling persons lia-
ble may encourage them to drain firm assets or shift ownership to 
criminal owners or owners who are less financially responsible. 134 Further, 
controlling person liability would spawn additional litigation among re-
sponsible parties over contribution. 
Controlling person liability could also cause satellite litigation be-
tween control persons and the firm over the apportionment of liability. If 
theory that controlling shareholder liability could be avoided by having a firm with no con-
trolling shareholder. However, if there is no controlling shareholder, liability can be imposed 
on controlling officers. See supra notes 35-40, 66-67 and accompanying text. If there is al-
ways some control person potentially liable, it is logical for that person to reap the advan-
tages of owning a majority of the stock together with his burden of liability. 
132. See, e.g., Egan, New York Mob Views Recycling and Turns Green, N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 28, 1990, at C20, col. 1; Blumenthal, Illegal Dumping of Toxins Laid to Organized 
Crime, N.Y. Times, June 5, 1983, § 1, at 1, col. 1 ("[g]arbage companies dominated by or-
ganized crime have been secretly and illegally dumping vast quantites of dangerous chemi-
cals throughout the New York area"); Clay, Cleaning Up Superfund's Incentive Structure, 
STAN. L. & PoLICY REv. 180, 184 (Spring 1990) (" 'midnight dumping' and other improper 
forms of disposal appear to increase proportionately with costs of legal disposal"); Cook, 
The Garbage Game, FORBES, Oct. 21, 1985, at 12. Other laws may accentuate this effect. For 
example, local laws requiring governmental bodies to accept the lowest bid for services have 
forced some to contract waste disposal to firms with criminal connections and histories of 
shoddy disposal. 
133. See Note, Parent Liability, supra note 32, at 997 (parental liability facilitates 
settlement by avoiding disputes that arise under traditional piercing criteria). 
134. For a discussion of the problems associated with shareholder liability, see supra 
notes 130-32 and accompanying text. 
1991] SCOPE OF LIABILITY 177 
control persons are liable, plaintiffs will frequently pursue them first be-
cause they frequently have the deeper pockets. If the controlling person 
owns all or the- firm's stock, little difference exists between pursuing ei-
ther the firm or the controlling persons. If the firm has minority share-
holders, however, one who has been held liable may sue the firm and 
other shareholders and officers for contribution. The novelty of such suits 
would make them difficult to resolve.185 Thus controlling person liability 
would reduce litigation minimally, if at alP36 
E. Lender Liability 
The fear that lenders cannot interfere with a debtor's business or 
seize collateral without risking CERCLA liability will deter them from 
making loans in industries dealing with hazardous chemicals. Fleet Fac-
tors dismissed this concern, claiming that its ruling would "encourage po-
tential creditors to investigate thoroughly the waste treatment systems 
and policies of potential debtors."137 Investigating and monitoring are ex-
pensive, however, and monitoring is useless unless the lender can stop 
any improper activities it finds. If the lender contracts for power to con-
trol borrower activities, though the lender is clearly an owner under Fleet 
Factors, 138 and thus subject to liability. 
Although the potential liability of lenders will promote caution, the 
additional caution may not be beneficial. As a CERCLA owner, the lender 
is liable even for disposals it could not prevent. Because of joint and sev-
eral liability, a lender's exposure could far exceed any damage done by its 
borrower. Moreover, many lenders are financial institutions that are re-
quired to avoid risky loans even if they can charge an interest rate com-
mensurate with the risk. Should the institution attempt to charge such an 
increased rate, the practice may be prevented by usury laws. Hence, the 
threat of liability to lenders may, by drying up credit or inflating its cost, 
impose costs far greater than the benefits of increased care in waste dis-
posal.139 Lender liability may not profit the government even in the short 
135. Because majority and minority shareholders share profits pro rata, perhaps they 
should likewise share liabilities. That would mean that the firm should be entirely lia-
ble-i.e., should indemnify the majority shareholder if it can. However, minority sharehold-
ers will argue that they are innocent and the majority shareholder should bear all liability 
because of his control. Thus, the results in such suits are hard to predict. 
136. SeeS. SHAVELL, supra note 118, at 174 (vicarious liability increases dispute reso-
lution costs). 
137. 901 F.2d 1550, 1558 (11th Cir. 1990). See also United States v. Maryland Bank & 
Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 580 (D. Md. 1986). 
138. For a discussion of a lender's status as owner, see supra note 40 and accompany-
ing text. To some extent it is appropriate that the foreclosing mortgagee bear the cost of the 
cleanup. As recognized in United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 
579 (D. Md. 1986), if the mortgagee-owner does not pay for the cleanup, the government 
may have to pay the cost while the mortgagee-owner realizes a windfall from the enhanced 
value of the cleaned up property. However, this windfall is unfair only to the extent that it 
leaves the mortgagee better off than it would have been had the debt to it been paid in full. 
Such a result appears extremely unlikely. 
139. See Guidice v. BFG Electro. & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 561-62 (W.D. Pa. 
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term. By forcing cleanup costs on lenders, the courts have exacerbated 
another problem: The CERCLA liability of banks is increasing the cost of 
the savings and loan bailout. 140 
Recognizing that these problems exist, the EPA has recently pro-
posed to absolve a lending institution from CERCLA liability if it sells 
contaminated property within six months of foreclosure. 141 Although this 
is a welcome step, it hardly remedies the problem. 
V. TowARD A MoRE FRUITFUL APPROACH 
So far this article has established that automatic liability of control-
ling persons under CERCLA is unwise. That does not mean that strict 
adherence to the canons of limited liability is ideal; the critique of limited 
liability is actually strong. To absolve those who are negligent gives rise to 
too many accidents and excessive engagement in risky activities. To im-
pose liability on those who are prudent, however, promotes excessive cau-
tion, underutilization of desirable activities, and inadequate spreading of 
costs. The proper goal is reasonable prudence. Prudence here means the 
exercise of caution to the point where the costs of additional caution 
would outweigh the benefits of such caution.142 
Defining reasonable prudence for controlling persons poses three con-
ceptual difficulties. First, how actively must controlling persons intrude 
into corporate affairs to establish reasonable prudence? Second, what 
standards of financial responsibility must they maintain? Third, what is 
the relationship between oversight and financial responsibility in estab-
lishing prudence? 
Critics charge that limited liability breeds negligence because a firm 
and its owners do not bear the full costs of the injuries they cause. Thus, 
as a condition to limited liability, controlling shareholders should be ex-
pected to make reasonable efforts to see that the firm is not negligent. In 
general, this should not require monitoring the day-to-day activities of 
the firm. That job is properly reserved for corporate officers. Rather, con-
trolling shareholders should see that the firm retains competent officers 
who install a reasonable program to prevent hazardous waste release. 
Closer monitoring should be required only when the shareholder has rea-
son to know that the firm's waste control program may not be adequate. 
The occurrence of accidents that lead or could have led to toxic releases 
should warn of a need for closer monitoring. To prevent willful ignorance, 
controlling shareholders should receive reports from the firm about the 
waste control program with such frequency and in such detail as are ap-
propriate for other matters of comparable importance. 
1989) ("a high liability threshold will enhance dual purposes of protecting bank's invest-
ments and promoting CERCLA policy goals"). 
140. See EPA Proposal Could Ease Lender Liability, Wall St. J., Oct. 10, 1990, at B6, 
col. 1. 
141. See id. 
142. For a discussion of cost-benefit analysis and its application, see supra notes 8, 31, 
96-97 and accompanying text. 
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This standard treats the, controlling persons as corporate law often 
treats boards of directors: It requires them to institute proper oversight 
programs. Further involvement is not required unless controlling persons 
know that a program is not working properiy.143 This similarity is in-
tended. Corporate law has long recognized that controlling shareholders 
and officers occupy a position similar to that of directors and should often 
be held to similar standards. 144 Indeed, individual shareholders frequently 
serve as directors. Further, parent corporations nominate individual di-
rectors who also serve as the parent's agents for receiving information and 
transmitting instructions. Therefore, it is appropriate to treat the share-
holders like directors for purposes of liability.145 
This standard avoids many problems of the traditional piercing doc-
trine, which often relies on unclear metaphors, such as domination and 
alter ego, and irrelevancies such as observance of corporate formalities. It 
also avoids the problems created by some CERCLA cases holding parents 
liable where they exercised close control over a subsidiary.146 These hold-
ings encourage a parent purposefully to ignore the activities of its subsidi-
aries, which as a result may become less environmentally responsible. The 
proposed standard rewards reasonable diligence by imposing liability only 
for negligence. 
Defining a controlling person's responsibility to assure the firm's fi-
nancial soundness is conceptually more difficult. Too low a financial stan-
dard allows owners to escape liability too inexpensively. A standard that 
is too high discriminates against smaller firms and their owners and 
might create detrimental barriers to entry in an industry.147 Drawing the 
line separately for each firm would be impossibly complex, while drawing 
143. See Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1595, 1602-03 (1978) ("board 
of directors is not expected to operate the business . . .. The responsibility of the board is 
limited to overseeing [each] operation."). 
144. See R. CLARK, supra note 48, at 141: "Directors, officers, and, in some situations, 
controlling shareholders owe their corporations, and sometimes other shareholders and in-
vestors, a fiduciary duty of loyalty." 
145. This position does not constitute an endorsement of corporate law's treatment of 
directors. The directors' standard of care is often too low. See Dent, The Revolution in 
Corporate Governance, the Monitoring Board, and the Director's Duty of Care, 61 B.U.L. · 
REv. 623, 644-54 (1981). The American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project has 
made a good effort to define the directors' duty of care. See ALI, PRINCIPLES OF CoRPORATE 
GoVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982). For a dis-
cussion of the director's duties, see Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAw 1595, 
1599-1618 (1978). 
146. For a discussion of parental liability, see supra notes 53-60 and accompanying 
text. 
147. To fulfill the financial requirements, smaller companies would have to obtain in-
surance, but most small companies find it hard to pay high premiums and to cover large 
deductibles. Larger companies could fulfill the requirement with financial reserves. In effect, 
larger companies could be self-insuring, thereby enjoying a competitive advantage by avoid-
ing costly outside insurance. See Sommerfield, Going Bare, INSTITUT. INVESTOR, Mar., 1989 
at 99, 100. Perhaps self-insurance is desirable since one goal of CERCLA is to ensure the 
financial responsibility of polluters. However, the resulting detriment to small businesses 
has some negative consequences. See S. SHAVELL, supra note 118, at 169. 
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the line for different groups of companies would create problems of prop-
erly categorizing each company. However, this administrative problem 
does not seem insuperable. 
Fortunately, Congress recognized the problem of financial responsi-
bility and provided for a plan to define financial responsibility within 
CERCLA. Section 108 of the Act requires the President to establish types 
and levels of financial responsibility for vessels and facilities. 148 Unfortu-
nately, the President has not yet discharged this duty. Until the adoption 
of such standards is complete, courts must do their best to define them. 
Although a precise formula may be impossible, several factors are rele-
vant. Financial responsibility should be proportionate to the firm's risks 
based on the types of hazardous substances handled, the use to which 
those substances are put, and the history of toxic spills in the firm and in 
other firms in the same industry. If the firm is uninsured, the court 
should inquire whether insurance was reasonably available, or whether 
the firm simply decided to forgo insurance. 
Even with the piercing and financial responsibility standards sug-
gested above, the public will have to pay for many hazardous waste clean-
ups. Public payment violates the rule of efficiency that activities should 
bear their costs. This problem could be avoided by financing Superfund 
with a special tax on the chemical industry. In fact, Congress has done 
just that. 149 This tax serves as a government mandated and operated in-
surance plan. However, the tax does lack some benefits of private insur-
ance plans. For example, the tax is not adjusted according to the unique 
risks posed by individual companies. On the other hand, the government 
arguably can monitor and regulate each company's compliance with envi-
ronmental safety laws better than the private insurance industry. In cer-
tain circumstances, private insurance might be superior to the industry 
tax. However, given the limited availability of private insurance for toxic 
spills, an industry tax is preferable. 
To encourage reasonable diligence, when courts hold a controlling 
person liable, they should avoid excessive liability. In particular, joint and 
several liability should not be used to impose liability disproportionate to 
the owner's negligence or the responsible firm's contribution to the re-
lease. The statute exacerbates this problem of excessive liability by bar-
ring actions for contribution in certain cases.uo Again, the statute may 
dictate the fate of responsible firms, but it does not dictate the treatment 
of controlling persons. The treatment of controlling persons must be de-
termined by the courts. Under both traditional piercing criteria and the 
special standards for controlling person liability applied in CERCLA 
cases, the touchstones have been equity and public policy. Courts may 
148. 42 U.S.C. § 9608 (1988). Similar requirements are imposed by the Solid Waste 
Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1988); and by the Resource Conservation Recovery Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 6973 (1988). 
149. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611, 4661 (1988). 
150. For a discussion of contribution for CERCLA liability, see supra note 39 and 
accompanying text. 
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reject or limit the liability of controlling persons where equity and public 
policy so demand.151 
The proposed standard does not contradict the strict liability im-
posed by CERCLA. Strict liability extends only to owners and operators. 
It does not extend to controlling persons.1112 Since controlling person lia-
bility was not defined by Congress, it must be fashioned by the courts. 
This analysis suggests why the different standard proposed by Pro-
fessor Alan Schwartz is somewhat imperfect. Professor Schwartz would 
pierce the corporate veil "if, when a firm's assets, including insurance as-
sets, are insufficient to satisfy tort claims, . . . the firm knew or should 
have known that it faced a positive probability of incurring a tort liability 
that would exceed its wealth."153 Schwartz's proposal incorrectly assumes 
the availability of insurance at reasonable premiums and ignores the pos-
sibility of excessive tort liability. Firms should be required to insure only 
if insurance is available at premiums that reflect risks. Uncertainty or the 
magnitude of the potential loss often make CERCLA insurance unavail-
able at reasonable premiums. 
This article's proposed standard resembles the corporate law stan-
dard of care for directors. It follows that the standard for liability of di-
rectors under CERCLA should be the same as for controlling 
shareholders. The standards for non-director officers should be somewhat 
different. Officers are supposed to oversee the day-to-day affairs of the 
business and, therefore, should be held liable for accidents that they 
should have prevented in the reasonable discharge of their duties. This 
premise should hold true even though the directors and controlling share-
holders who are not officers might not be liable.154 Officers do not, how-
ever, have the general power to determine the firm's hazardous waste 
treatment or its capital structure. Therefore, officers should not be held 
liable for shortcomings in these areas unless they personally caused the 
problem. Moreover, individual officers have reason to be cautious without 
having to worry about CERCLA liability. m Thus; courts should hesitate 
to hold them personally liable. 
151. Holding a controlling person partially liable for a firm's obligations is unusual. 
Secondary liability has generally been an ali-or-nothing proposition. However, the special 
features of CERCLA-such as strict liability, joint and several liability, limitations on the 
right of contribution, retroactive liability, and immense, uninsurable damages-justify novel 
approaches. Neither equity nor public policy precludes holding a controlling person liable 
for some but less than all of a firm's CERCLA obligations. 
152. For a discussion of controlling person liability, see supra notes 33-44 and accom-
panying text. 
153. Schwartz, supra note 83, at 716-17. 
154. Again, this position does not constitute an endorsement of the law's treatment of 
officer liability. Corporate law has improperly ignored the duties of officers and focused on 
the duties of directors. Occasionally, however, the law-including criminal law-has im-
posed harsh, unfair and unrealistic demands on corporate officers. See generally United 
States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) (chief executive officer of corporation with 36,000 em-
ployees and 900 facilities held criminally liable for unsanitary conditions in one facility). 
155. For a discussion of individual officer liability, see supra notes 60-68 and accompa-
nying text. 
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Lenders have good reason to review a borrower's potential liabilities 
before extending credit and to require covenants to comply with the law 
once credit is granted. Generally, lenders cannot efficiently contribute ef-
forts other than these to prevent toxic spills. Courts should, therefore, 
hesitate to demand any more from lenders and should hold lenders liable 
only under rare circumstances. Exceptions should include cases where a 
lender insists that a debtor in financial trouble make payments that ham-
per the debtor's ability to comply with the law, including CERCLA. Be-
yond such exceptional circumstances, the costs of additional lender 
liability would be substantial and the benefits small. 
CONCLUSION 
This article originated with a desire to question the wisdom of lim-
ited shareholder liability. The argument against limited liability at first 
seems powerful. A closer analysis, however, reveals that the argument 
weakens considerably in the CERCLA context. The same would seem 
true in other areas of environmental law. What this suggests for limited 
liability in other areas of tort law is not at all clear. Therefore, we should 
hesitate to accept broad answers and should continue to study limited 
liability in environmental law. 
